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Abstract
In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain
in power and extract rents. Instead of viewing the favors’ beneﬁciaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous
entity, we allow the king to decide whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential
support - their strength - they could bring to the regime. While the ruler can select the elites on the basis
of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in introducing some uncertainty in the
cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients’ cooptation price since in the
event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that
weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society’s strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the
composition of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is
more likely to randomly coopt subjects. Weak institutions Autocracy Rent seeking Elites
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11 Introduction
Recent developments in the economics and political science literature have contributed to a deeper under-
standing of the close interrelationship between institutions and political regimes. In weakly institutionalized
settings, rulers acquire and maintain the right to hold oﬃce even when most of the citizens disagree with the
policies implemented. The lack of “democratic accountability” is not synonym of anarchy, however, since a
social contract typically ties the ruler to the rest of the population. The terms of this social contract depend
on both the polity’s institutional development, and on the associated dictator’s1 degree of accountability.
The present paper focuses on those ill-performing regimes where rulers rely on clientelistic networks to re-
main in power as a consequence of the institutional vacuum. More precisely, we explore a king’s optimal
cooptation strategy and the determinants of alternative clientelistic patterns. The centrality of this question,
in our view, lies in that the ensuing wealth distribution directly impacts on the quality of the institutions,
and thereby constitutes a fundamental pillar of the inequality-development nexus in weakly institutionalized
polities (Cervellati et al., 2008).
Feeble institutional constraints are accompanied by autocratic rulers who are tied to their subjects by
mutual rights and obligations speciﬁed in an informal contract which must be self-enforcing (Kirstein and
Voigt, 2006). To secure suﬃcient power to avert revolutionary attempts, a non-democratic leader may create
a climate of fear, while a complementary tool consists in distributing rewards. Since, however, the leader’s
endogenously accumulated power cannot be controlled by this same coercive power (Bar-El, 2009), the
leader’sfollowersneedtoberewardedaccordingly. Hence, underthissocialcontractthekingcooptssubjects
by bartering political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract rents2 (Azam,
1995; Platteau, 1995).
Cooptation is therefore a basic ingredient of the self-binding contracts tying rent-seeking dictators to
their subjects. Such bonds, that have equally been deﬁned in the literature as patron-client relationships, can
be understood as an asymmetric exchange where-by the recipient of a gift vows allegiance to the patron by
rewarding the latter with his support and thus increasing the dictator’s power (Homans 1961; Blau 1964;
Wintrobe 1998; Konrad and Leininger, 2007; Platteau and Sekeris, 2007)3. When rulers make extensive
use of this cooptation strategy, we are in the presence of a personal rule (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984;
Padro-I-Miquel, 2007) where “the rivalries and struggles of powerful and wilful men, rather than impersonal
ideologies, publicpolicies, orclassinterests, arefundamentalinshapingpoliticallife”(JacksonandRosberg,
1984: 421).
While rulers extract rents and, therefore, potentially hamper economic development, some sharing of
the pie with relevant subjects - the patron’s clients - must occur in parallel. But this postulate is contra-
dictory with the simplifying assumption adopted elsewhere in the literature that rulers and the ruling elites
(clients) constitute a single and exogenous entity (see for instance Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, and Ace-
moglu et al., 2001). The latter approach implicitly assumes that the most powerful elements of the society
spontaneously unite in a monolithic block. Such coalitions may indeed form, as exempliﬁed in Mugabe’s
power-sharing agreement with Tsvangirai, or in General Musharraf’s support of (and by) the Pakistanese
1According to Wintrobe (1998), the accountability criterion can be used to distinguish dictatorships from democracies.
2Notice that such contracts are immune from commitment problems to the extent that, given the compensations granted by the
king are linked to his rule, it is incentive compatible for the favors’ beneﬁciaries to support the on-going regime. On the other hand,
the king also circumvents potential commitment problems by actually transferring these favors instead of barely promising privileged
treatments.
3Indeed, material goods can be traded against allegiance since the payback may take a form diﬀerent from the medium of the
original favor (Ekeh 2004: 35). Hence commodities may be exchanged against symbolic attributes such as social prestige and political
power; a material gift, which never goes un-repaid, can thus be reciprocated, say, by a demonstration of loyalty, allegiance, homage,
respect, subordination, devotion, etc...
2army’s top oﬃcers during his presidency (2001-2008). When such coalitions form, they result in the most
unequal distribution of income. Other types of coalitions have equally been observed, however, as the
populist policies of Chavez in Venezuela, and of Ahmadinejad in Iran corroborate. Given these observed
diﬀerences in cooptation policies, we address the question of what makes speciﬁc agents relevant. What are
the subjects’ characteristics that determine their inclusion in the body of elites?
The subjects’ loyalty has been identiﬁed in the literature as a fundamental determinant of a leader’s
clients (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002; Egorov and Sonin, 2006). When deﬁning loyalty as the propensity
ofsupporterstodefectfromaleadertoachallengerwegrasphowessentialthisconceptisbothbecauseofthe
political stability the despot may enjoy, and because of the reduced material demands of faithful supporters.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003: 66) attract our attention on the strategy of coopting the subjects whose exit
opportunities are the gloomiest because of these individuals’ loyalty. Since despots secure their followers’
loyalty by outbidding the exit opportunities of the latters (Wintrobe, 2001), increasing the subjects’ loyalty
equally reduces cooptation costs. An optimal strategy for the leaders therefore consists - to the extent it is
feasible - in increasing their subjects’ loyalty. Creating stigmata to modify the agents’ loyalty has undeniably
been applied throughout history. Rare are the situations, however, where subjects have failed to adapt to
such changing environments, thereby annihilating the whole mechanism. In the present paper we focus
our attention on those contexts where no particular characteristics of the subjects such as their race or their
religion tie them to a speciﬁc regime.
Taking a step toward the endogeneization of the ruling coalition, some authors have incorporated in their
reasoning the fact that the proceeds of an extractive strategy depend on the size of the ruling coalition which
is therefore endogenously determined (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2004, North et
al., 2009). Under the premise that all potential clients are of equal importance, this approach is certainly
convincing. Lifting the homogeneity assumption, however, widens the strategy set of the ruler. Acemoglu
et al. (2008) recognize the importance of agents being heterogeneous in power, and analyze the endogenous
formation of the ruling coalition. This approach diverges from the patron-client setting we have described,
where a monopolistic ruler purchases clients to avert turmoil. In choosing which subjects to patronize, and
which to jettison, the monopolistic ruler gauges the contribution of a particular agent, in terms of power, to
his cooptation cost. Hence, if as one would expect, weaker subjects are corruptible at more moderate prices,
the king may decide to ‘trade’ a small number of powerful clients for cheaper, albeit weaker, subjects.
Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Padro-I-Miquel (2007) provide alternative explanations regarding the low
cooptation cost borne by some autocratic rulers. In the former model the ruling elite faces two opposition
groups that could jointly overturn the kleptocratic dictator if only the elites did not credibly threaten to buy-
oﬀ one of the factions in case of a revolutionary attempt. In the latter paper, the ruling elites take advantage
of the fear felt by their ethnically similar clients at the prospect of being saddled with a ruler of an other
ethnic group in case of a revolution. In a closely related article to these two studies, Gandhi and Przeworski
(2006) show that, when the opposition to the regime is suﬃciently strong, rents (and policy concessions) are
used as a cooptation device at equilibrium.
While these papers point at mechanisms that inﬂuence the cost of cooptation, none enlightens us on
the size of the clientele, and on its composition4. Both Gershenson and Grossman (2001) and Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) broaden our comprehension of elites formation by allowing the size of the clientele to
be endogenous. The associated trade-oﬀ is that a larger clientele makes the regime safer but is also costlier to
sustain (see also North et al., 2009). The trade-oﬀ between the clientele’s size and the cooptation cost is also
underlined in Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). In their setting, the individual cooptation cost is endogenous,
and weak (strong) governments distribute large (small) beneﬁts to few (many) clients.
4Acemoglu et al. recognize that “the gains to an extractive strategy may depend on the size of the ruling elite. When the elite is
small, each member would have a larger share of the revenues, so the elite may have a greater incentive to be extractive” (2001: 1376)
3The models just presented either assume that a single representative agent acts on behalf of the potential
clients, or else suppose the clients belong to a pool of homogeneous agents. Acemoglu et al. (2008) lift
this hypothesis and study the endogenous formation of ruling coalitions. The authors assume that coalescing
agents that gather suﬃcient power can eliminate potential opponents forever and share the society’s rents
among themselves. We diverge in two respects from Acemoglu et al. (2008). Notice ﬁrst that patron-client
relationships cannot be analyzed in their setting since the necessary hierarchy among the ruling coalition
members constitutes a black box. By pre-deﬁning the potential kings, we impose a hierarchy that eventually
allows us to understand whom the patron is willing to take as a client. The second main divergence rests
in the hypothesis that potential foes can be eliminated. In our setting, however, we assume that the king
coopts subjects that thereby strengthen his ranks, without giving him the possibility to eliminate opponents.
Had the king such a possibility to recursively decide whom to annihilate, apart from the reduced number of
clients we would observe at equilibrium, few qualiﬁcations to our main ﬁndings would be added.
As Acemoglu et al. (2008), we allow each agent to be heterogeneously endowed in power and we derive
results regarding the equilibrium cooptation price, the size of the clientele, but also regarding the identity of
the clients. One of the central results of our paper echoes the above ﬁnding of Bertocchi and Spagat (2001).
We add, however, the qualiﬁcation that (relatively - but not too) weak rulers will selectively choose to bribe
the society’s strongest individuals, while (relatively) strong rulers diversify the composition of their clientele.
To understand the rationale of this result, one needs to grasp the mechanisms of the underlying strategies: the
selective coopation strategy, and the random cooptation strategy. The former strategy consists in selecting
one’s clients on the basis of their personal characteristics, i.e. their power attributes. The clients anticipate
that if a revolution was to occur they would be called in the new elite’s body again because of their power
attributes. To avert a revolution, the number of subjects the “king” has to rely upon will be relatively low
because of their substantial individual strength. The clients’ individual cooptation cost, however, is likely
to be important. Under the second strategy, the ruler deliberately allocates gifts in a partially indiscriminate
fashion, hence the denomination “random”. More precisely, the leader secures the support of a portion
of each strata of the society, and therefore includes in the body of elites both weak and strong subjects
alike. This obviously implies some strong potential opponents being sidelined. The equilibrium individual
cooptation cost under the random cooptation strategy is therefore lower, while the clientele is larger. As
a consequence, a weak ruler prefers sharing with few individuals the society’s rents so as not to dilute the
wealth among a large number of clients. A strong ruler, on the other hand, requires little support, and
therefore prefers to randomly coopt clients among a large pool of subjects, with a view to ensuring a low
individual cooptation price. Remark that the ruler needs not to be too weak for, otherwise, he may prefer
behaving as a “roving bandit”, i.e. maximizing the product of theft and, hence, depriving the citizenry of its
wealth in the manner described by Olson (1993).
A second interesting ﬁnding links the optimal cooptation strategy to the discount factor. We show that
when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt the clients.
For low discount factors, the ruler will either selectively choose his clients, or else be a roving bandit (Olson,
1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996), depending on his “roving ability”, i.e. his ability of not getting caught
while depriving his subjects of their wealth.
To highlight the relevance of the two cooptation strategies we propose in this model, we present in the
next section a short overview of the cooptation strategies in XXth century Russia. In a second section we
present the model and the main results, and in the last section we conclude.
42 Cooptation in XXth century Russia
20th century Russia provides an interesting historical record of varying cooptation strategies that we can
partially interpret in light of the two strategies we propose in this paper: the selective cooptation strategy,
and the random cooptation strategy. In the pre-Stalin and post-Khrushchev periods, the cooptation patterns
were essentially “selective”. By that we mean that the favours were granted to clients on the basis of their
individual features (wealth, lineage, education). On the other hand, both under Stalin and Khrushchev, the
body of elites was much more heterogeneous in terms of the characteristics deemed relevant for securing
the regime’s integrity, and the beneﬁts granted to the clients were usually more modest. It is therefore not
unreasonable to pinpoint elements of the random cooptation strategy in these latter situations.
A diachronic feature of Imperial Russia was the Czars’ reliance upon a very narrow section of the pop-
ulation, the nobility. As in the rest of medieval and Renaissance Europe, the king’s court gathered the
kingdom’s most powerful and inﬂuential elements5. The 1917 revolutions that empowered the Bolsheviks
were expected to radically transform the existing order. Once in power, however, the ambitious intellectuals
that had mounted the revolution emulated their predecessor’s clientele (Grossman, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2003). The elites throughout this period were therefore selected upon those personal characteristics
that granted them with power in the society.
Until the fall of the USSR in 1991, the policies of all Soviet Union’s strongmen heavily relied on the
system of Communist Party membership that institutionalized cooptation (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2001).
With the rise of Stalin to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s
Central Committee in 1922, the whole clientelistic network underwent dramatic changes. The strategy of
Joseph Stalin6 consisted in concentrating all the nation’s power in the hands of an almighty ruler, himself,
while cultivating a climate of fear7. In parallel, however, instead of pursuing the strategy of coopting the
most powerful elements of the nation alone, Stalin widened the accessibility to high oﬃces and therefore
systematically embraced much less competent agents as well (Solzhenitsyn, 1973)8. These decisions are
consistent with the random cooptation strategy. Stalin alienated powerful elements of the society by taking
unprecedentedmeasuresagainstmanymembersoftheoldBolshevikelite, andagainsthighlyrankedmilitary
oﬃcers (Solzhenitsyn, 1973; Belova and Gregory, 2009). The evidence on Stalin’s top oﬃcers provided in
Egorov and Sonin (2006) is striking. It is documented that in 1934 and in 1937, around 40 percent of the
highest ranked oﬃcials of the NKVD9, on whom Stalin relied heavily to secure the control of the state, had
less than 7 years of total schooling, while another 40 percent had not completed 10 years of schooling.
During the Khrushchev era that followed Stalin’s death, the new priorities of the central command were
to promote economic growth while securing the privileges of an increasingly large and diversiﬁed body
of elites. The use of the random cooptation strategy therefore persisted and Khrushchev’s policies have
accordingly been qualiﬁed quasi-populist (Cohen, 1979).
5The causal link may seem dubious since being the follower of a King obviously endows one with power. To the extent that strength
is equally a function of wealth, family ties, and astuteness and cunningness, our interpretation that personal characteristics translate
into power hold.
6Stalin is known to have been subject to deep paranoid personality disorder.
7Joseph Stalin is said to have cynically claimed that “one death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic (Bueno de Mesquita et
al., 2003: 347). During the Great Terror (1936-1938), the Soviet regime conducted massive purges that, according to some sources, are
said to have provoked up to 20 millions of victims (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
8Stalin’s strategy, according to the standard interpretation of scholars, consisted in getting rid of his political enemies. Lazarev
(2003) opposes this argument by claiming that the large scale replacement of highly ranked oﬃcers, and the promotion of “young
cadres” to positions previously held by “enemies of the people” constitute evidence supporting his own theory. His argument, which
does not contradicts ours, is that Stalin intended to provide incentives to rank-and-ﬁle members so that the latter produce higher eﬀort,
and thereby increase the overall rents.
9Peoples Commissariat for Internal Aﬀairs, or what amounts to the Ministry of internal aﬀairs.
5As soon as he acceded to power, Brezhnev (1964-1982) proceeded with the implementation of a num-
ber of conservative reforms and changed cooptation strategy. The elite’s privileges were strengthened; the
favourable treatment up to then enjoyed by a wide category of citizens was interrupted; the people’s freedom
got signiﬁcantly reduced (Cohen, 1979), and, in comparison with the previous administration, the educa-
tional qualiﬁcations of the reduced body of elites that beneﬁted from the system, i.e. the nomenklatura, were
drastically improved (Hanley et al., 1995). In fact, years of economic decline compelled Brezhnev to restrict
the accessibility to high oﬃces because of the important cost of having, in his predecessors’ fashion, a large
clientele. Indeed, the decline of the central regime’s power would have compelled the ruler to accommodate
more subjects in the nomenklatura. The observed switch in cooptation technique would then be consistent
with a desire to reduce cooptation expenditures.
Between Brezhnev’s death in 1982 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the USSR experienced
a transitory period that was mainly marked by Gorbachev’s pro-western policies. As it was approaching its
end, and until its collapse, the regime carried out a number of reforms of the body of its elites. The most
notable transformation was the relatively high turnover among these elites, whose ranks were ﬁlled with
much younger, educated members of high social origins (Hanley, 1995; Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996).
The demise of the USSR did not disturb the old practices of assigning key political and economic posi-
tions to powerful citizens: “the Russian government facing the opposition of industrial ministries, managers,
workers, and regional and local governments which held formidable power, handed over huge amounts of
wealth to a very narrow section of the society that, in turn, supported Boris Yeltsin’s re-election” (Bertochi
and Spagat, 2001: 606). It is in fact not surprising that a collapsing central power preferred to rely on its
most powerful elements instead of seeking the approval of a wider spectrum of the society. Indeed, as a
consequence of the regime’s weakness, the latter strategy would have required the inclusion of a very large
segment of the society. The new post-communist elites were drawn from Soviet-era nomenklatura mem-
bers (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996). Despite the replacement of some of Breshnev’s lieutenants by
younger members of the old nomenklatura, the class reproduction has been very extensive (Hanley, 1995;
Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996:722).
This short overview on the elite selection and composition in Russia during various periods of the XXth
century allows us to identify two distinct cooptation techniques. One strategy used by Russian rulers (Czar
Nicholas II, the Bolsheviks, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin) consists in selecting clients on the basis of spe-
ciﬁc individual characteristics. An alternative strategy applied by Stalin and Khrushchev is to purposefully
not rely on individual-speciﬁc characteristics. The model of the next section brings elements that help us
understand these various cooptation techniques.
3 The model
3.1 The Framework
Consider a kingdom of size R (stock), where each parcel of land generates an equal amount of rents per time
period (ﬂow). The total per-period ﬂow is denoted by r. This kingdom is inhabited by n subjects, and one
leader and a challenger denoted, respectively, k and ¯ k. The distribution of property rights over the kingdom’s
total territory in time period t is denoted by the vector Rt = {Rt
k,Rt
1,...Rt
n}, where the superscript designates
the time period, and the subscript captures the identity of the players. The game starts in period 0 and the
ruler holds all the territory, i.e. R0 = {R,0,...0}. Moreover, when a ruler is newly enthroned in time t,
Rt = R0. At each time period, the leader l faces the constant risk of being overturned by the challenger and
his backers. Given the revolutionary threat, the ongoing king can either predate the community’s wealth, or
else coopt subjects to remain in power by distributing property rights. Denote these actions by at
k = {p,c},
6If at
k = p, the predatory leader appropriates the entire present ﬂow of resources, r, and attempts to ﬂee
the community with the booty. We assume that with probability (1 − ϕ) ∈ [0,1] a predator gets caught by
his subjects who then share equally these rents among them. The king may alternatively opt for cooptation,
i.e. at
k = c. The leader then coopts subjects of his kingdom by granting them property rights over lumps
of the productive resources, i.e. over parcels of the territory. We assume that transferring property rights
involves a minor transaction cost of  per transaction. In period t the property rights vector inherited from
the previous period, t − 1, is denoted Rt. Given this inherited property rights’ vector, the ruler decides the
new property rights vector Rt0
in period t. The ruler bears a cost of z, where z stands for the number agents
whose property rights are altered in period t. Provided the same ruler remains in power from one period to
another, Rt = Rt−10
. If the king is deposed all the territory comes under the control of the newly enthroned
king who inherits all the community’s stock of resources, i.e. Rt
k = R, and who therefore faces the same
choices as the initial leader.
In a second stage of the game, the subjects who are asymmetrically endowed in strength simultaneously
decide whether to devote their individual strength to support and protect the ruler (supporters), or else to
oppose him (dissidents)10. Formally, in time period t any subject i takes an action at
i = {s,d} with s desig-
nating the decision to support the leader, and d the decision to dissent. Each subject i is endowed with some
strength fi that depends on his type. There are k types of individuals and an equal number of subjects of each
type. We label the subjects by two subscripts; the ﬁrst one denotes his type, and the second one designates
his position inside a group of subjects of the same type. When ranking the kingdom’s subjects according to
their strength we obtain the following vector: (f11, f12,... f1n/k, f21, f22,... f2n/k,..., fk1
, fk2,... fkn/k). The diﬀerence in strength between any two consecutive types is assumed constant and equal
to the weakest type’s strength, ¯ f/k. We thus have that fji = j ¯ f/k, and fki = ¯ f. The subjects’ aggregate
strength is denoted by F. In deciding whether to support or the dissent, the subjects take into consideration
the king’s and the challenger’s strength, which are both assumed to equal L. We assume that L > ¯ f 11.
Furthermore, being in power grants the king an incumbency advantage, i.e. the control of an army whose
strength equals G. The king’s total strength equals the sum of his own strength and of his clients’ strength,
G+L+
P
f∈S f, where S stands for the subset of supporters. The opposition movement’s aggregate strength,
D + L, equals the sum of the dissident individuals’ strength, D =
P
f∈D f - where the D stands for the set
of dissidents - and of the challenger’s strength, L. If the dissidents manage to gather more power than the
central regime, i.e. if D > S + G, a revolution occurs, the rebels appropriate the community’s total rent and
share the booty equally among them12. If, on the other hand, a revolution attempt fails, the king’s supporters
share the dissidents’ rents equally among them. Lastly, notice that the leader’s and the challenger’s role does
not only consists in deciding the sharing of the community’s wealth when occupying the throne. We also
assume that the two potential leaders fulﬁl a coordination role in our model. More precisely, if a subset of
subjects are better oﬀ by jointly deviating from a proﬁle of actions, such a deviation is implemented.
In the time period following a successful revolution, the new ruler who was previously the challenger
obtains the control of the entire territory R, and the above-described two-stage game is played again. If
however, the dissidents fail to gather suﬃcient strength to topple the regime, the ongoing leader remains in
power.
10Following Acemoglu et al. (2008), we interpret this strength parameter as political or military power, depending on the polity’s
degree of institutional development.
11Assuming the potential rulers to be the kingdom’s strongest elements is equivalent to having the king endogenously selected under
an all-pay auction mechanism. Indeed, should the successful revolutionaries compete in a subsequent stage for the throne under an
all-pay auction, the strongest individual would always prevail. See also Konrad and Leininger (2007).
12It could be objected that the revolutionaries’ payoﬀ should reﬂect their individual contribution to the outcome. Our interpretation
of the revolution is, however, diﬀerent. While the position an individual will occupy in the newly constructed society is a function of
his strength, during the revolution this individual is as eﬀective as anyone in looting the loosers’ belongings.
7The players interact over an inﬁnite time horizon. We focus on the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of
this game13.
3.2 Analysis
Since we solve the game for the MPE, at any time period t the players condition their action on Rt - the
(inherited) property rights regime - and on the other players’ (expected) actions. Any player j’s objective is
to choose a strategy Σj = (σ0
j,σ1
j ...σ∞
j ) that maximizes his inter-temporal utility for any given strategy of
the n remaining agents. For a constant (and identical across agents) discount rate of δ, the discounted ﬂow









Under the state variable vector R and given the other players’ strategy, σ−j, the maximal utility any agent









where Vj(R) is the value function for j under state R, while T(.), the transition function, gives the probability
that some particular state is realized in the next time period.
We solve this game by optimizing backwardly for a period game. Given some vector of state variables,
R, we therefore ﬁrst determine the subjects’ optimal actions for any pair of actions (ak,R
0
) of the leader.
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Condition (i) states that if at optimality a revolution is averted, then it is never in the interest of a set of
subjects whose joint opposition would depose the ruler to actually do so. Condition (ii) is the analogous one
when the best responses b−k yield a revolution.
13While the natural equilibrium candidate for an inﬁnite time period game is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE), we restrict
the analysis to the MPE as has become standard in the related literature (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2004;
Padr´ o-I-Miquel). We follow this path to simplify the analysis since this assumption allows us to focus on a subset of the SPE set. While
the latter equilibrium requires that the players’ strategies are Nash in every proper subgame, the MPE possesses the additional feature
that at any time period only the payoﬀ-relevant history should matter.
8A consequence of enabling the subjects to coordinate their actions is that, given the deterministic out-
come of a revolution, either all subjects support the ruler, or else all subjects join the opposition. Indeed, not
joiningasuccessfulrevolutionamountstoforegoingthesharingoftherevolutionaryloot, r, whilesupporting




The following Lemma permits us to restrict our attention to the relevant actions of the ruler:
Lemma 1 There exist at most two potential equilibrium vectors of state variables R∗. Either R∗ = R0, or







The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The vector Rcoopt stands for the territorial distribution such that the ruler’s instantaneous utility is max-
imized under the constraint that the rents ﬂowing to the clients are suﬃcient to avert a revolution (ai = s
for all subjects). In the remaining of the analysis we restrict the range of parameters to G < F to avoid the
possibility that Rcoopt = R014. While there exists an inﬁnity of vectors averting a revolution, the associated
cooptation costs diﬀer. The ruler’s objective consists in minimizing his expenditures, and the following
lemma characterizes the ruler’s strategies satisfying this condition:
Lemma 2 In a stationary equilibrium there exist only two cooptation strategies: the selective cooptation
strategy and the random cooptation strategy
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The selective cooptation strategy consists in transferring property rights according to the agents’ individual
characteristics, i.e. their strength. The alternative strategy of randomly selecting the transfer recipients
reduces the clients’ individual claims because of the increased uncertainty associated with this selection
process. Denote by cs the cost of selectively coopting clients, and by cr the cost of randomly coopting clients.
Lemma 2 implies that at equilibrium, whenever cs < cr (cs > cr), provided the ruler follows a cooptation
(instead of predatory) strategy, his best response consists in selectively (randomly) coopting clients at any
time period. In case of equality the leader is completely indiﬀerent when ﬁrst enthroned, but given his initial
cooptation choice, it is optimal never to modify it afterwards because of the transaction costs. We break the
inequality in favour of the selective cooptation mechanism.
3.3 Selective cooptation of clients
When the ruler selectively buys-oﬀ clients, the clientele remains composed of the same subjects irrespec-
tively of whether a revolution occurred or not in the previous time period. This cooptation strategy grants
the clients a particularly powerful situation since their exit option is to be clients of a new king in case the
present ruler does not satisﬁes their present needs.
The individual cooptation cost, xs
i stands for the amount of rents that make agent i indiﬀerent, between,
ontheonehand, obtainingthepresentclientelisticrentforever, and, ontheotherhand, provokingarevolution
that entitles him to be client of a newly enthroned king (the challenger). Formally:










14If G ≥ F, the king requires no internal support to remain in power and, hence, retains control over the entire territory. This
would reﬂect a situation where the king never needs to commit to be non-predatory and to secure private property rights, a prerequisite
according to North and Weingast (1989) to observe economic development.
9Any individual receiving xs
i is deterred from joining the opposition, unless a revolution is expected to occur.
This implies that if a subject receives less than xs
i, his best response is either to support the ruler if the
aggregate strength of subjects receiving at least xs
i is suﬃcient to avert a revolution, or else to oppose the
regime. Since the individual cooptation cost is identical across subjects, the ruler’s optimal strategy is
to minimize the number of clients. It is therefore straightforward to conclude that the optimal selective
cooptation strategy is to buy-oﬀ the community’s strongest subjects.
In Appendix A.3 we compute the total number of individuals (ns) to coopt, and this enables us to obtain
the total cooptation cost under the strategic selection strategy, cs, which equals:
cs = nsxs =






      r (3)
From these results stems the next lemma:
Lemma 3 When the ruler selectively coopts his clients to remain in power, the higher the incumbency
advantage as measured by the kingdom’s army and/or the weaker the subjects, the smaller the number of
subjects to coopt, and, therefore, the lower the total cooptation cost.
The ruler coopts only the strongest subjects since the clients’ claims being independent of their strength,
theoptimalstrategyconsistsinminimizingthenumberofclients. Sinceastrongercentralpowerrequiresless
clients in order to retain power, the total cost of cooptation decreases in the ruler’s incumbency advantage.
Likewise, when the subjects are weaker their support is less compelling, and the analogous conclusions can
be drawn.
3.4 Random cooptation of clients
We next turn to the computation of the random cooptation strategy’s choice. As the stochastic connotation
may prove misleading, we attract the reader’s attention on the exact working of this strategy. Under the
random cooptation strategy, the leader selects an equal number of subjects inside any power-type group of
individuals. The randomness in the selection process therefore occurs among subjects of the same type.
When the ruler survives to the next time period, since the territories transferred proved just suﬃcient to
avert a revolution, the property rights’ vector will remain unaltered forever, i.e. the king has no incentive
to bear the (small) transaction costs associated with a modiﬁcation of the property rights distribution. A
direct consequence of this strategy is that independently of their strength, all the subjects have the same
likelihood of being selected as clients. Compared to the selective cooptation scenario, the community’s
strongest elements are therefore less eager to provoke a revolution when already belonging to the clientele.
As a consequence, this enables the ruler to bribe subjects at a lower cooptation price.
The individual cooptation cost, xr
i, is such that the clients are therefore indiﬀerent between obtaining
the present clientelistic rent forever, and provoking a revolution that entitles them to be clients of a newly
enthroned king with some probability less than unity. Formally:
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λ stands for the share of subjects that are not coopted by the ruler. The share of subjects that are
coopted at equilibrium, (1−πr
λ), is thus given by the following expression when the ruler applies the random
selection strategy:
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This allows us to evaluate the total cost of randomly selecting the clients, cr:
cr = (1 − πr
λ)nxr =
(1 − δ)(1 − πr
λ)
1 − (1 − πr
λ)δ
r (6)
We can then state the next lemma:
Lemma 4 When the ruler randomly coopts his clients to remain in power, the total cooptation cost is in-
creasing in the subjects’ strength and decreasing in the ruler’s strength. If the agents value more the future,
the total cooptation cost decreases as the subjects become individually less demanding.
While, similarly to the selective cooptation strategy, the total cooptation cost is increasing in F and
decreasing in G, the reasons driving this result are richer under the random selection strategy. Indeed, on
the one hand, like in the selective gift making, the number of clients decreases in the ruler’s strength and
increases in the subjects’ aggregate strength. Under the present scenario, however, the individual cooptation
cost moves together with the number of clients, thus reinforcing the previous eﬀect. The reason lies in that
as the size of the clientele becoming larger, the likelihood of being randomly assigned a gift increases as
well. Stronger subjects, or subjects that face weaker rulers, will therefore be more demanding in terms of
compensation for not rebelling since their exit opportunity is more attractive. The second part of the propo-
sition highlights the negative relationship between the value of the gift and the discount rate. This result
may seem counter-intuitive to the extent that when assigning more weight to the future, one increases the
value of that option. The intuition of this result hinges on that the discounted expected payoﬀ of provoking
a revolution has to be compared with the discounted expected payoﬀ of supporting the ruler. A client pro-
voking a revolution runs the risk of not being included in the body of elites under the new king. Supporting
the king, however, implies the subject secures a constant ﬂow of rents in the future. When subjects attribute
more weight to the future, the king is therefore able to reduce the gift necessary to keep the present clients
disciplined.
3.5 Equilibrium gift
Our analysis highlights the two diﬀerent cooptation equilibria that may emerge. In the game’s ﬁrst stage,
however, the ruler equally needs to decide whether to “predate” the kingdom or to “coopt”. In this section
we explore the conditions giving rise to the various equilibria.
Because of the stationarity of the strategies implied by the Markov hypothesis, and given that the ruler
and the challenger have the same characteristics, the cooptation strategy is an equilibrium strategy if it is
robust to the One-Stage-Deviation Principle (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991:108-110)). This is the case if
the following condition is satisﬁed:
(r − c) + δ(r − c) + δ2 (r − c) + ... ≥ ϕr ⇔ c ≤ (1 − ϕ(1 − δ))r = ccoopt (7)
where c = min{cs,cr}, stands for the minimal cost in terms of foregone rents that the on-going ruler should
support to avert a revolution. On the LHS of this expression one can read the inter-temporal utility of the
ruler when transferring rents (through territorial concessions) of total value c in any single time period. The
RHS payoﬀ captures the deviation payoﬀ, given that the challenger sticks to the equilibrium strategy of
coopting clients to remain in power.
11On the other hand, the predatory strategy is an equilibrium strategy if:
ϕr + ϕδ2r + ... > (r − c) + δϕr + ... ⇔ c ≥
1 + δ − ϕ
1 + δ
r = cpredate (8)
where the LHS of the ﬁrst inequality captures the deviation payoﬀ. Comparing the “predation” condition
with the “cooptation” condition, we can easily show that cpredate < ccoopt meaning that for c < cpredate
the optimal strategy consists in coopting, and for c > ccoopt the optimal strategy is the predatory one. For
intermediate values of c it is straightforward to show that the utility of the predator is higher to the one of
the coopting ruler, thus implying that the threshold value of c is given by cpredate.
The total cooptation cost should therefore not be too high for the king to coopt. Indeed, by condition (7)
we know that the total cooptation cost should be lower than ccoopt, which is independent of the king’s relative
strength. Moreover, from Lemmas (3) and (4) we know that relatively more powerful kings face lower total
cooptation costs, independently of the elites’ selection mechanism. Hence, while relatively stronger kings
are more likely to coopt, we still need to identify their optimal cooptation strategy. The ruler opts for the
strategic cooptation of clients if cs < cr, which can equally be expressed as (see Appendix A.4):
1 >






     δ (9)
Some straightforward comparative statics on Condition (9), allow us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When a leader rules as a “stationary bandit”, he is more likely to selectively coopt clients,
instead of randomly choosing the elites, when the subjects are strong and when the King’s strength is low.
While one would clearly expect weak rulers to despoil the kingdom of its wealth rather than establishing
a long run social contract, Proposition (1) equally sheds light on the trade-oﬀ faced by relatively stronger
kings. Powerful kings have the possibility to either aﬀord a small clientele of expensive subjects when
dispatching targeted gifts, or else to coopt a larger clientele of less exigent clients who are chosen randomly.
We have shown that when the incumbency advantage is stronger, the ruler requires less support from his
subjects under both strategies, as highlighted in Lemmas (3) and (4). Under the random selection mechanism,
however, we described the additional role of the incumbent’s strength in securing cheap clients: by reducing
the number of clients required to control the community, a stronger ruler decreases the odds that an insurgent
may become a client under the new regime, and, therefore, the present elites are coopted at a more modest
price. Even in the absence of this second mechanism, however, increasing the incumbent’s strength would
have a starker impact on the number of randomly coopted subjects (i.e. larger reduction of the recipients’
pool) since under the random selection strategy the coopted individuals are on average weaker. It thus
follows that combining the two mechanisms exacerbates the tendency pushing stronger rulers to randomly
choose the elites. Regarding the subjects’ aggregate strength, the same mechanisms apply and we therefore
reach the same conclusions.
Understanding which clientelistic policy a ruler adopts is only relevant when the king is a “stationary
bandit”, i.e. if he coopts at equilibrium. The conditions making him willing to develop a clientelistic
network are therefore essential. Proposition (1) points at the very intuitive eﬀect of increasing the king’s
relative strength: the more secure a ruler’s power, the more likely he struggles to remain in power. The
players’ time preferences are also essential, however, in understanding the king’s optimal strategy. On the
one hand one expects more patient rulers to prefer the cooptation strategy, which turns out to be the case in
our setting. On the other hand, however, the eﬀect of the discount rate on the optimal cooptation strategy







, below which, provided the predatory strategy is dominated, the king always prefers
selectively designating the elites rather than randomly coopting clients. From these observations stems our
next proposition:
Proposition 2 The higher the discounted value of future outcomes, the more likely that a king establishes
a long-run relationship with randomly coopted clients at equilibrium. For lower discount rates, the king
is more likely to selectively choose the elites, unless the king’s probability of successful theft is suﬃciently
large and the king becomes a “roving bandit”.
Proposition (2) states that there exists a unique discount rate δ∗ = (1 +
√
πr)−1 ∈ [0,1] below which
the ruler selectively assigns gifts, and above which the random selection strategy is followed. Indeed, when
δ = 0 the randomly chosen elites are as demanding as the selectively picked clients since the prospect
of being a client if a revolution succeeds is irrelevant in the decision-making process (see equation (5)).
Given that randomly selecting clients necessarily implies more subjects being bribed at equilibrium than
if the stronger elements of the community had been selectively coopted, it follows that when δ = 0 the
selective selection strategy always dominates the random selection strategy. At the other extreme, when
δ = 1, the randomly coopted subjects are not willing to jeopardize the comfortable position of belonging
to the body of elites, for the uncertain alternative of toppling the king and running the risk of receiving no
rents at subsequent time periods. The subjects are therefore willing to compromise with extremely modest
gifts since all future periods grant them the same discounted utility. Since the value of the gift is nil at the
limit, the random selection mechanism is necessarily more attractive, even though the number of subjects to
buy-oﬀ is larger. Continuously increasing the value of δ from 0 to 1, the individual cooptation cost under
the random selection mechanism is continuously decreasing as well, hence the proposition’s result. Our
ﬁnding reﬂects the standard game theoretic result that as the discounted value of future outcomes becomes
more important, the agents become more cooperative. Indeed, the randomly coopted subjects become more
cooperative when δ increases, and this translates in a willingness to compromise for lower compensations.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the endogenous incorporation of subjects in the body of elites when a rent
maximizing autocrat allocates gifts to remain in power. While a weak and/or impatient ruler is likely to
behave as a “roving bandit”, two alternative strategies may be implemented by a king who chooses to be
a “stationary bandit”. The ruler can choose his clients for their personal characteristics, i.e. their power
attributes. Selectively chosen elites anticipate that in the event of a revolution, their privileged position is not
jeopardized since it will be in the successor king’s interest to integrate them in the clientele as well. Thus, all
clients can credibly threaten the king to join the opposition, and this eventually means the clients’ individual
cooptation price is important. As a consequence, under the selective cooptation strategy the ruler seeks to
minimize the number of clients and he therefore integrates only the society’s strongest elements in the elites.
Under the alternative random cooptation strategy, the king deliberately coopts subjects in a more stochastic
manner. The clients anticipate that, under this strategy, the risk of exclusion from the body of elites in case
of a revolution is signiﬁcantly increased, and are thus more inclined to compromise. This reduced individual
cooptation cost comes at a price, however, since by randomly allocating favours the king does not integrate
in the elites all the society’s strongest elements. In fact some strong subjects may not be included in the
clientele, while some weak subjects are granted a privileged treatment. As a consequence, for a revolution
to be averted, the overall size of the clientele needs to be larger.
13Two main results are derived from our model. In the ﬁrst place, we ascertained that when the king
is weak relative to his subjects, he selectively bribes the society’s strongest individuals, while a relatively
strong ruler diversiﬁes the composition of his clientele. A weak ruler prefers to share with few individuals
the society’s rents, rather than to scatter the privileges among a large number of clients, and thus forgo a
greater part of the wealth. On the other hand, a strong ruler requires little support, and therefore prefers to
randomly coopt (few) clients among a large pool of subjects so as to ensure a very low individual cooptation
price.
The second central ﬁnding of this work regards the eﬀect of the discount factor upon the king’s equilib-
rium strategy. We show that if the discounted value of future outcomes is high, it is more likely that a king
establishes a long-run relationship with randomly coopted clients at equilibrium. For low discount rates, the
king will either selectively choose his clients, or else will be a roving bandit if the likelihood of his not being
caught while depriving his subjects of their wealth is suﬃciently high. This result hinges on the mechanism
underlying the random cooptation strategy: for higher values of δ the prospects of not being included in the
future elites in case of a revolution are more detrimental upon a client’s utility. As for the selectively coopted
clients, their present actions do not impact upon their future payoﬀ, hence their actions are independent of
the discount factor.
Equipped with our model and the results we just presented, we can better interpret the anecdotal evidence
on Russia exposed earlier. We do not aim at providing a thorough explanation of the various policies fol-
lowed by the Russian leaders since the internal organization of Russian elites is too complex to be captured
with this simple model15.
Czar Nicholas II was indeed in constant need of internal support to secure his ruling position, especially
so in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat of the Imperial forces in the war against Japan in 1905. For
their part, the Bolsheviks, after seizing power thanks to the successful 1917 revolutions, faced a very strong
internal opposition. Some forty years later, when in 1964 Brezhnev took over power the de-Stalinization and
liberalization policies of the Khrushchev era had spawned new forces in the Soviet Union. The number of
elites got signiﬁcantly reduced and key positions were only accessible to the most inﬂuential members of the
Communist Party. The eﬀects on the Russian economy were fatal, and by the time of Brezhnev’s death in
1982 the whole system was literally crumbling. In the 1980s dissent in the U.S.S.R. reached unprecedented
levels. The successive pre and post-communist regimes therefore granted increasingly important positions
and privileges to rising opponents.
In contrast with the practice of privileging one’s most dangerous potential adversaries, both Stalin and
Khrushchev purposefully allowed citizens of lower social rank, and with less political inﬂuence, to penetrate
the previously hermetic circle of elites. Stalin managed to create an environment of Fear and to personally
control the military, thus directly inﬂuencing the power balance between the regime and potential internal
opponents. Khrushchev inherited a weak and obedient society and was therefore able to implement the
reforms mentioned earlier while perpetuating Stalin’s policy of not exclusively rewarding the society’s most
powerful elements.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In t = 1, either a revolution occurred in the previous time period, hence R1 = R0, or else no revolution
occurred and R1 = R
00. Deﬁne R00
= Rcoopt. We want to show that Rcoopt is uniquely deﬁned. Assume
15see Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996) for a detailed description of the Russian elite’s organization.
14not. Then there exists some strategy that we denote by tilde such that ˜ Rτ , ˜ Rτ+1 for some τ > 0. If
uτ
k(˜ Rτ) > uτ
k(˜ Rτ+1), this strategy cannot be an equilibrium one since it is dominated by a strategy such that :
ˆ Rt = ˜ Rt, ∀t , τ + 1, and ˆ Rτ+1 = ˜ Rτ. Indeed, denoting by zt the number of property rights that are modiﬁed




k(ˆ Rτ+1) + ˆ zτ+1

> ˜ zτ + δuτ
k(˜ Rτ+1)
Taking the limit of this expression when  tends to zero, we obtain: uτ
k(ˆ Rτ+1) > uτ
k(˜ Rτ+1), which has been
assumed so.
Similarly, if uτ
k(˜ Rτ) < uτ
k(˜ Rτ+1), we can replicate the tilde strategy with the diﬀerence that ˆ Rτ = ˜ Rτ+1, and
show this alternative strategy yields a higher payoﬀ. Thus, at equilibrium the property rights vector needs to
be the same at any two consecutive periods, and, therefore, Rcoopt is uniquely deﬁned.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 is the consequence of two facts: (i) if fij > flj, then we must have that xij ≥ xlj, and (ii) if it is
optimal to reduce the likelihood of a speciﬁc subject being coopted as compared to the random cooptation
strategy, then it is optimal to assign him a zero likelihood of being coopted.
Denote by πij the likelihood agent ij is coopted. The ﬁrst part of the proof is straightforward. Assume
the opposite. Then it means that pij < plj. Invert the probabilities of coopting both agents, so that their
payoﬀs are inverted as well and the total cooptation cost remains unchanged. It follows that the net gain in
support for the ruler equals 2(fij − fkj), with the diﬀerence being counted twice because whatever is lost to
the opposition amounts to a gain for the leader. This creates scope for reducing the number of subjects, and
this operation is therefore always implemented.
The second part of the proof is a consequence of the linearity property of the payoﬀ functions in the
cooptation strategies. Indeed, any payoﬀ in [xr, xs] can be replicated by a linear combination of these
payoﬀs. Denote by αij and 1 − αij, respectively, the probability that subject ij is selectively and randomly
coopted. By linearity we have that:
xij = αijxs + (1 − αij)xr
Equivalently, the linearity property implies that if xlj < xr, kj’s payoﬀ can be written as a linear combination
of the random cooptation and of no cooptation at all. Hence, denoting the respective weights by βlj and
1 − βlj we obtain:
xlj = βljxr
Assume that it is optimal to have x
0
lj < xr as compared to xlj = xr. This implies that β
0
lj < 1, and that
the likelihood of another agent being selectively coopted - subject ij - increases. From (i), it follows that
x
0
ij > xij ≥ xr, and that α
0





∆α(xs − xr). The beneﬁt of this operation is given by: (1−β
0
lj)xr = −∆βxr. Since this operation is proﬁtable,
−∆βxr > ∆α(xs − xr). Given, however, that the conﬂict probability is linear in the participants’ strength,
a decrease in lj strength of ∆β will always be exactly compensated by an increase in ij’s strength of ∆α.
Hence, it is optimal to set βlj = 0.
15A.3 Optimal number of clients under selective co-optation
Since the co-opted subjects are the community’s strongest individuals, the weaker subject to be co-opted,
subject λ, is such that:



















Since fλ = λ ¯ f/k, we deduce that the strength of any subject of type λ is given by:
G + F =
λ2
k2









(k − λ) = n

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A.4 Comparison of cs and cr
Using expressions (3) and (6), cr > cs if:





















πr > (1 − πr)δ
⇔ 1 >

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